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Basel II: Operational Risk Measurement in the Portuguese Banking Sector 
and an Evaluation of the Quantitive Impacts 
 
 
 
The present work is aimed at understanding the general notion and origin of the 
New Basel Accord, which intends to attain international bank stability, 
emphasizing the convergence between regulatory capital and economic capital, 
applying its risk sensitive methodologies. This work focuses on one of the 
principal novelties of Basel II – operational risk and its respective methodologies 
for calculating minimum capital requirements. The New Capital Accord 
encourages financial institutions to gradually evolve from basic to sophisticated 
methodologies. Institutions using more sophisticated methods will be rewarded 
by deductions on the capital allocated for the calculation of the capital ratio. The 
methodologies associated to operational risk will be applied to a group of 
national banking institutions. These methodologies are referred to in Pillar I of 
the New Capital Accord: (i) basic indicator approach, (ii) the standardized 
approach and (iii) the alternative standardized approach. The purpose of this 
practical application is to evaluate and quantify the impact due to the 
introduction of Basel II. 
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Abstract 
 
The present work is aimed at understanding the general notion and origin of the 
New Basel Accord, which intends to attain international bank stability, emphasizing the 
convergence between regulatory capital and economic capital, applying its risk sensitive 
methodologies. This work focuses on one of the principal novelties of Basel II – 
operational risk and its respective methodologies for calculating minimum capital 
requirements. The New Capital Accord encourages financial institutions to gradually 
evolve from basic to sophisticated methodologies. Institutions using more sophisticated 
methods will be rewarded by deductions on the capital allocated for the calculation of 
the capital ratio. The methodologies associated to operational risk will be applied to a 
group of national banking institutions. These methodologies are referred to in Pillar I of 
the New Capital Accord: (i) basic indicator approach, (ii) the standardized approach and 
(iii) the alternative standardized approach. The purpose of this practical application is to 
evaluate and quantify the impact due to the introduction of Basel II. 
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Introduction 
The present work aims at transmitting a general idea of the New Basel Capital 
Accord, also known as Basel II, focusing specifically on its main novelty - operational 
risk. 
The main objectives of Basel II are to maintain international stability in the banking 
system and to create a unique methodology for calculating minimum capital 
requirements for internationally active banks. With the complex and consecutive 
transformations in the banking sector, this methodology was adapted to the banking 
reality, fortifying the minimum capital requirements in financial institutions. With these 
ongoing transformations in the banking activity, different types of losses began to 
occur, diverging from the losses due to the traditional risks, consequently appearing 
operational risk. 
This work investigates the benefits of the application of different methodologies 
introduced by Basel II, for operational risk, in the Portuguese banking sector. We intend 
to evaluate the impact of a more sophisticated methodology versus a basic one, 
registering both the advantages and disadvantages. 
Basel II, fortifies the minimum capital requirements in financial institutions. These 
minimum requirements can be calculated through several methodologies and are more 
sensible to the existing risk in each institution, stimulating more efficient risk 
management. Basel II, besides the objectives already mentioned, has also introduced the 
following concepts: 
1. Improve risk measurement and management, keeping adequate levels of 
liquidity, solvency and solidity;  
2. Converge regulatory capital and economic capital;  
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3. Increase the dialogue between the National Supervisor and the financial 
institutions, referring risk measurements and management; and  
4. Increase market discipline, bank transparency and information.  
The New Basel Accord aims at converging economic capital and regulatory capital. 
The use of more sophisticated methods for calculating an institutions risk will be 
rewarded with less levels of capital (IFB, 2006). 
According to Jaime Caruana (2005), the previous President of the Basel Committee, 
the more risk sensible the methodology is for calculating minimum capital 
requirements, regulatory capital will be better adjusted to the institutions risks and will 
be closer to economic capital. 
Basel II was implemented on January 1, 2007 in the G10 countries. It is built on 
three pillars as can be observed in Figure 1 [Insert Figure 1]. 
Pillar III of the New Basel Accord has the objective to assure better transparency on 
the financial situation and solvency of the institutions, allowing the market to create a 
more precise analysis of banks´ profile and risk, applying incentives to fortify financial 
institutions risk management and levels of capital (IFB, 2006). 
In Pillar II, the national supervisor, the Bank of Portugal, has the objective to assure 
that all national banks have sufficient minimum capital to face all incurred business 
risks. The national supervisor must also stimulate the development of techniques that 
improve risk management in banks. 
Finally, Pillar I, assures that banking institutions withhold minimum capital 
requirements, sufficient to cover all existing risks. 
According to Chorafas (2005), despite the concept of operational risk only having 
appeared now, these occurrences, associate to this type of risk, exist for a long time. 
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Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), refers to the importance of operational risk in regulatory 
capital, referring that the minimum capital requirements for operational risk, in some 
cases, can exceed the capital requirements for market risk.   
There are two versions of the definition of operational risk. The first version, 
belonging to the BCBS, as expressed in its documents, defines operational risk as the 
risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal control, human resources and 
systems or from external events, including legal risk (BCBS, 2006). The second 
version, expressed by the Bank of Portugal in Aviso n.º 3/2006, will have that to 
converge to the definition in the Basel II framework. This Aviso defines operational risk 
as being the risk of losses as a result of the inadequate or negligent application of 
internal procedures, human resources and systems or from external causes. 
Similarly as what happens to credit risk, financial institutions will also be able to 
choose between three methods for calculating minimum capital requirements for 
operational risk, each more sophisticated and risk sensitive (IFB, 2006). 
As pointed out by Mori and Harada (2001); Sundmacher (2004); Currie (2004a, 
2004b and 2005); and Jobst (2007), with even bigger relevance the BCBS (2006), the 
calculation of the minimum capital requirements is effectuated by three distinct 
methods. 
The Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), as the name indicates, is the simplest. Capital 
charge is a fixed percentage of the annual gross income, as indicated by the BCBS. In 
the standardized approach (TSA), institutions must map their activities in eight distinct 
Business Lines (BL). In this situation, the annual gross income for each BL is 
multiplied by a specific β, associated to each activity. Finally, the advanced 
measurement approach (AMA), institutions will be able to use internal models with 
capacity to measure operational risk and the minimum capital to be allocated.  
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With the intention to seek existing information on operational risk, the Risk 
Management Group (RMG), a specific branch of the BCBS, proceeded to obtaining 
data from 89 financial institutions from 19 countries in Europe, North and South 
America, Asia and Australia. The treatment of this data had the objective to gather 
information concerning operational losses during 2001, the allocation of capital for 
operational risk, and the expected operational losses associated to each banks BL 
(RMG, 2003). 
With this investigation the RMG concluded that the banking sector is evolving 
quickly in what relates to the retraction of data for operational risk purposes. On the 
other hand, financial institutions are still developing methods for properly retrieving this 
data (RMG, 2003). 
Moscadelli (2004) used the data collected by the RMG in 2002, and treated this data 
statistically. With this work, Moscadelli (2004) obtained a relationship between the 
average gross income and capital charge for each BL. This contribution by Moscadelli 
(2004) makes it possible to calculate the average gross income per BL, these values are 
still difficult obtain in a financial institution´s annual report. 
Both authors, Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and Moscadelli (2004), concluded that 
there exists two obstacles when analyzing operational losses. In first place, the quality 
of the retracted data can be dubious and in second place, there are operational losses that 
are not registered by the financial institutions. 
Sundmacher (2004) begins his work from the idea that there are advantages to 
applying a more advanced methodology, meaning that less capital will be allocated for 
operational risk, as referred by the BCBS. The author questions the situation where a 
bank generates activities primordially with superior β´s. In this case, the institution will 
have to allocate more capital when using TSA than the BIA, without having any 
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incentives in developing advanced models for operational risk. Sundmacher (2004) 
concluded that there should exist a system of rewards, this is, an incentive for financial 
institutions to progress and develop advanced methodologies.  
As referred before, the use of a more sophisticated method in calculating minimum 
capital requirements, is rewarded by a lower level of capital to be allocated. 
Sundmacher (2007) effectuated simulations, estimating the amount of capital to be 
allocated for the National Australia Bank. Using the banks annual gross income from its 
annual reports from 2001 to 2004, the author calculated the capital charge for 
operational risk for both the BIA and TSA. For TSA, Sundmacher (2007) distributed the 
annual gross income equally into the eight BL, elaborating different scenarios. 
This author concluded that the financial incentive to evolve from the BIA to the 
TSA was minimum. Of the three elaborated scenes, only in one situation existed 
benefits in evolving from the BIA to TSA, differing from the concept that the 
application of a more sophisticated method consumes less capital. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
methodologies for calculating the minimum capital requirements for operational risk. 
The third section referrers to the empirical application of the methodologies developed 
by the BCBS and the concluding remarks are provided in the last section. 
 
Methodology 
Basic Indicator Approach 
According to BCBS (2006), the capital requirements for operational risk must be 
equal to the average over three years of a fixed percentage of the annual Gross Income 
(GI) denoted as α. GI is defined as net interest income plus net non-interest income.  
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After concluding the Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS), the Basel Committee fixed 
α as 15%. The BIA is expressed by the following equation: 
α×= GIKBIA                                                                (1) 
where: 
KBIA = the capital charge under the Basic Indicator Approach; 
GI = annual gross income, where positive, over the previous three years; and 
α = 15%. 
The BIA does not consist of any specific criteria to eligible for applying, however, 
banks are encouraged to comply with the committee´s guidance on Sound Practices for 
the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk (February of 2003) (BSBC, 
2006). 
  
The Standardized Approach and Alternative Standardized Approach 
The Standardized Approach 
As stipulated by the BCBS (2006), this method foresees that banks´ activities are 
mapped into eight specific BL. Each BL is assigned a factor denoted as β, as can be 
observed in Table 1 [Insert Table 1].  
The factor β for each BL was previously defined by the Basel Committee, and 
reflects historical operational losses. The capital charge for TSA is the sum of the GI of 
each BL multiplied by its respective β. TSA can be expressed by the following 
equation: 
( )∑ ×= iiTSA GIK β                                                           (2) 
where: 
KTSA = the capital charge under the Standardized Approach; 
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GIi = annual gross income in a given year, as defined above in the BIA, for each of the 
eight BL, where i= 1, 2, 3… 8; and 
β i = a fixed percentage, set by the Committee for each of the eight business lines, 
where i= 1, 2, 3… 8. 
 
The Alternative Standardized Approach 
The Alternative Standardized Approach (ASA) is similar to TSA, except for the 
treatment given to two BL: retail and commercial banking. For these BL the variable GI 
is substituted by the variable Loans and Advances (LA), which can be retracted from 
the banks´ annual reports. The values of LA associated to retail banking and commercial 
banking are multiplied by a fixed factor m (3.5%) and then multiplied by there 
respective β´s, 12% and 15%. It is permitted to join the two BL applying a β of 15%. 
The capital charge can be expressed by the following equation: 
( ) ( )∑ ××+×= CBRBCBRBiiASA mLAGIK // ββ                                  (3) 
where: 
KASA = the capital charge under the Alternative Standardized Approach; 
GIi = annual gross income in a given year, as defined above in the BIA, for each of the 
eight BL, where i= 1, 2, 3… 8; 
β i = a fixed percentage, set by the Committee for each of the eight business lines, 
where i= 1, 2, 3… 8; 
βi/RB/CB = a fixed percentage, set by the Committee for each BL, retail banking and 
commercial banking, where i= 1, 2, 3…8; 
LARB/CB = loans and advances (average of the last three years) for retail and 
commercial banking; and 
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m = 3,5%. 
For both TSA and ASA it is of great importance to classify an institutions activities 
in there respective BL as shown in Table 2 [Insert 2 Table].  
 
Advanced Measurement Approach 
This last method foresees that financial institutions elaborate an internal operational 
risk measurement system using quantitative a qualitative criteria. Institutions will 
calculate capital charge as the sum of expected losses (EL) and unexpected losses.  
The following equation expresses how to calculate capital charge under de AMA: 
( )∑ += ULELK AMA                                                           (4) 
where: 
KAMA = the capital charge under the Advanced Measurement Approach; 
EL = Expected Losses; and 
UL = Unexpected Losses. 
 
Empirical Results 
Although the Portuguese economy has grown at moderate levels, the banking sector 
continues to register a quick expansion. The continuous expansion in the Portuguese 
banking sector is due to, essentially, to the growth in loans and advances. This growth 
in the banking sector was accompanied by higher solvency levels and greater levels of 
bank return (Relatório de Estabilidade Financeira, 2006). 
The methodologies used for calculating capital charge for operational risk was 
applied to seven, well known financial institutions in Portugal: 
1. Banco Espírito Santo (BES); 
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2. Banco Internacional do Funchal (BANIF); 
3. Banco Português de Investimentos (BPI); 
4. Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD); 
5. Millenium BCP (BCP); 
6. Montepio Geral (MG); and 
7. Sistema Integrado Crédito Agrícola Mútuo (SICAM). 
Due to the impossibility of retraction of internal data on operational losses, as 
referred by authors such as Rowe (2004), Currie (2005) and Sundmacher (2007), the 
AMA will not be applied to these banks in the Portuguese sector. 
The value of the GI was extracted from the banks´ annual reports between 2002 and 
2006, as can be observed in Table 3 [Insert Table 3]. 
BCP leads with the highest GI, attaining 2.703.700 thousands of euros in 2006, 
distinguishing itself from the remaining institutions. CGD and BES rank second and 
third positions. Ranking last is BANIF with a GI of 194.909 thousands of euros, in 
2006.  
As referred in the previous chapter, GI is the average of the last three years when 
positive. For example, the GI for 2007 is the average GI during 2004, 2005 and 2006, as 
can be observed in Table 4 [Insert Table 4]. At this point it is possible to calculate 
capital charge for the BIA and TSA.  
For the ASA we must first extract the values for LA from the annual reports and 
calculate the average of the last three years for both retail and commercial banking. 
As observed in Table 5 [Insert Table 5], BCP leads with 57.912.000 thousands of 
euros in LA, while CGD and BES rank, once again, second and third. Ranking last, as 
observed with GI is BANIF. The ranking in this table is similar to the ranking of GI 
with the exception of MG and SICAM which invert position. The data in Table 6 [Insert 
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Table 6] shows the average of the last three years of LA. At this point it is also possible 
to calculate capital charge of these Portuguese institutions using the ASA. 
 
Basic Indicator Approach 
In accordance with the BCBS (2006) and the Aviso n.º 9/2007 of the Bank of 
Portugal, the capital charge using equation 1 from the previous chapter was applied, 
resulting the data in Table 7 [Insert Table 7].       
This Table shows the capital charge for the seven Portuguese banks using the BIA. 
With this analysis we can easily observe a linear relation between GI and capital charge, 
due to the fact that capital charge is a fixed percentage of GI. We can verify that BCP 
will allocate the most capital for operational risk with 367,450 thousands of euros in 
2007. Ranking in last place is BANIF, allocating 27,047 thousands of euros in 2007.  
 
The Standardized Approach 
To apply this methodology financial institutions must map there activities 
accordingly into eight BL as pointed out in the previous chapter. GI will also have to be 
divided into each BL, every fraction being multiplied by a fixed percentage β as defined 
for every BL. Capital charge is equal to the sum of multiplication between the eight 
fractioned GI and there respective β´s.  
   Basel II introduced some difficulties into the banking sector, that is, banks were 
not prepared for more advanced methodologies. In this section we face the obstacle of 
the majority of institutions not having the necessary information in there annual reports 
for analysis. The decomposition of GI per BL, that is, the classification of activities per 
BL as introduced by Basel II is still not complete in many institutions. 
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In the study elaborated by Moscadelli (2004), the author concluded on the 
decomposition of GI per BL as seen in Table 8 [Insert Table 8], he concluded these 
results having based himself on data retrieved from the RMG. This contribution by 
Moscadelli (2004), makes it possible to calculate, in average terms, the fraction of an 
institutions GI belonging to each BL and simultaneously calculating capital charge for 
operational risk for TSA and ASA. 
As a result of the application of equation 2, we deduced Table 9 [Insert Table 9], 
with the capital charge to be allocated according to TSA. 
In this case, the ranking of capital charge per institution is identical to the one of 
the BIA, that is, BCP continues to rank first place and BANIF ranks last. This is due to 
the fact that the decomposition of GI per BL is identical for all the financial institutions, 
as Moscadelli (2004) pointed out, in reality this is not so linear, bank activities can 
differ significantly from institution to institution.  
 
Alternative Standard Approach 
In this methodology, such as in the previous one, financial institutions must classify 
there activities accordingly into the eight BL. This methodology differs from previous 
one in what respects retail and commercial banking. For these two BL, GI will be 
substituted by the value of LA associated to these two BL. Similar to what happened in 
TSA, in this approach we notice that LA are not divided into BL in banks´ annual 
reports, being therefore used for this effect the results obtained by Moscadelli (2004) for 
GI, as decomposed in Table 8. As can be observed in the Table, the combined weight of 
GI for retail and commercial banking is 54,4%. This reference was used to distinguish 
the fraction of LA for both retail and commercial banking. This decomposition of LA 
may not be a rigorous representation of reality but significant divergences are not 
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expected. Table 10 [Insert Table 10] represents the values referring to 54.4% of the 
initial value obtained for LA for every institution. 
Appling equation 3 results in Table 11 [Insert Table 11], which represents capital 
charge for the ASA. 
As can be observed in Table 11, capital charge for the ASA results in a ranking 
similar to TSA, with the exception of MG and SICAM, which invert positions. This is 
due to the fact that MG has a greater amount of LA than SICAM. 
This occurred because an independent variable (LA) was introduced to the equation. 
The more independent variables are introduced to the equations used to calculate 
minimum capital requirements, capital charge begins to converge with the banking 
reality. Basic methodologies, based in fixed values, result in capital charges which may 
not be a clear image of the operational risk existing in a bank.  
 
Results Analysis  
As can be observed, the results of the application of the three methodologies, BIA, 
TSA and ASA are presented in Table 12 [Insert Table 12], we verify that the impact in 
progressing from BIA to TSA is identical in all the institutions. This occurrence is due 
to the fact of the decomposition of GI, being identical for every institution. We can 
observe a decrease of approximately 3.20% in capital charge in using TSA. The ASA 
showed that the introduction of LA to the equation had significant results in the various 
institutions. Specifically, BCP, BES and SICAM, decreased there capital charge, 
varying from 5% to 16%. The inverse situation also occurs, the cases of BPI, MG and 
BANIF showed an increase in capital charge which varies from 1% to 22%. The case of 
CGD is peculiar, capital charge starts by decreasing in 2005 and then increases in 2006 
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and 2007. Another analysis also evidenced here, is the option of an institution 
progressing directly from BIA to the ASA. This analysis shows that this option is 
favorable to all the financial institutions, with the exception of BPI and MG. BPI would 
have an increase in capital charge of about 1%, which is insignificant. The case of MG 
is more severe, the increase in capital charge would reach 18% in 2007. Maintaining 
TSA in this case is more advantageous for MG. The increases in capital charge of BPI 
and MG are due to the introduction of the variable LA. The remaining institutions 
showed significant reductions in capital, in some cases, as for example SICAM, the 
decrease reached 18.5%. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
Basel I satisfied its initial objectives during many years, guaranteeing financial 
stability of the international banking system. However, the fast transformation in the 
banking sector requested that Basel I revised its framework. The New Capital Accord, 
Basel II, came to fortify minimum capital requirements in financial institutions, 
improving the levels of solvency and solidity of each institution. 
In the present work, beyond the application of the methodologies for operational 
risk, we verified the axiom that is constantly referred to in the Basel Framework and 
studies elaborated by other authors. This axiom is based on the fact that the application 
of an advanced or sophisticated methodology will benefit a bank, decreasing capital 
charge for operational risk. 
According to the elaborated analysis in the previous chapter and considering the 
results pointed out by Moscadelli (2004), we verify that, when abdicating of the BIA 
and adopting TSA, the financial institutions will benefit of a capital charge reduction of, 
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approximately, 3.2%. This conclusion was similar to the one Sundmacher (2007) 
obtained, opting for TSA over the BIA, capital charge will decrease although 
insignificantly. 
On the other hand, we must be conscious that these results will depend on the 
activities dominated by each institution. As Sundmacher (2004) referred in his study, an 
institution that dominates BL with greater β´s , for example, 18%, will allocate more 
capital in an advanced methodology, being more advantageous applying the BIA, which 
has an α of 15%. The opposite may also occur, when institutions dominate BL with 
smaller β´s, for example, 12%. In this last situation, the institution will allocate less 
capital using TSA. 
In the last methodology, ASA, we verified diversified results, the introduction of the 
variable LA influenced capital charge to increase or decrease in comparison to TSA. We 
also verified that in the majority of the banks, progressing from BIA to ASA is, in 
general, advantageous, that is, less volume of capital to allocate. 
The contribute of this work consisted on evaluating the benefits of the use of a more 
sophisticated methodology set out by the Basel Committee for each one of the seven 
Portuguese banking institutions. As referred previously, progressing from BIA to TSA 
is beneficial for all institutions, the second choice, progressing directly from BIA to 
ASA is equally favorable. The use of the more advanced methodologies TSA and ASA 
are limited to the mapping of banks´ activities, which as we can observe in there annual 
reports are still in need of some structuring. 
In what says respect to the application of the ASA, institutions will have to evaluate 
its situations better. In the case of four institutions, CGD, BPI, MG and Banif, it is 
preferable to remain in TSA, especially in the case of MG where capital charge 
increases, approximately 22%. On the other hand, BCP, BES and SICAM benefited 
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with the application of the ASA, SICAM benefited with a decrease of approximately 
16%. In the case of progressing directly from BIA to ASA, institutions can save up to 
18,5% of capital, which is the case of SICAM, however,  they can lose up to 18%, such 
as MG. 
As Currie (2004b) referred in her work, significant increases in capital charge can 
have negative consequences in institutions, that is, they may desire to increase the 
general level of prices which can result in a credit crunch. 
Although there have been significant progresses in recent years, Holmes (2003) 
refers that there are still obstacles when analyzing operational risk. First, operational 
risk is very hard to be correctly quantified. Second, while credit risk can easily be 
identified, it is difficult to evaluate if all operational risk situations have been included. 
In third place, certain risks can lose there relevance in an institution throughout time. 
Finally, the difficulty in validating a good method of calculating capital charge 
decreases its own reliability. 
Currie (2005) refers that the greatest obstacle in operational risk is that, non-
measurable factors cannot be controlled and that quality cannot be measured, therefore, 
cannot be controlled. 
Throughout the years, Basel II will undergo various changes, improving every 
detail. Information for analysis will become easier to retrieve from annual reports due to 
the rigidness of both the Supervisory Review Process and Market Discipline. In this 
perspective, it is important to analyze the advanced methodologies (AMA) and conclude 
on there impacts on financial institutions.    
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Appendices 
Figure 1. Basel II Pillars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Business Lines and β Factors   
BL β 
Corporate Finance (β1) 18% 
Trading and Sales (β2) 18% 
Retail Banking (β3) 12% 
Commercial Banking (β4) 15% 
Payment and Settlement (β5) 18% 
Agency Services (β6) 15% 
Asset Management (β7) 12% 
Retail Brokerage (β8) 12% 
Source: BCBS (2006) 
 
 
 
 
Basel II Framework 
PILLAR I: 
Minimum Capital 
Requirements 
PILLAR II: 
Supervisory Review 
Process 
PILLAR III: 
Market Discipline 
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Table 2. Mapping of Business Lines 
BL Activity Groups 
Corporate Finance 
 
1. Mergers and acquisitions, underwriting, privatisations, 
securitisation, research, debt (government, high yield), equity, 
syndications, IPO, secondary private placements 
Trading and Sales 1. Fixed income, equity, foreign exchanges, commodities, credit, 
funding, own position securities, lending and repos, brokerage, 
debt, prime brokerage 
Retail Banking 
 
1. Retail lending and deposits, banking services, trust and estates 
2. Private lending and deposits, banking services, trust and 
estates, investment advice 
3. Merchant/commercial/corporate cards, private labels and retail 
Commercial Banking 1. Project finance, real estate, export finance, trade finance, 
factoring, leasing, lending, guarantees, bills of exchange 
Payment and Settlement 1. Payments and collections, funds transfer, clearing and 
settlement 
Agency Services 1. Escrow, depository receipts, securities lending (customers) 
corporate actions 
2. Issuer and paying agents 
Asset Management 1. Pooled, segregated, retail, institutional, closed, open, private 
equity 
2. Pooled, segregated, retail, institutional, closed, open 
Retail Brokerage 1. Execution and full service 
 Source: BCBS (2006) 
 
Table 3. Annual Gross Income 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
BCP 2.353.000 2.674.500 2.242.400 2.402.900 2.703.700
CGD 1.992.880 1.880.102 1.941.284 1.772.738 2.093.611
BES 1.354.000 1.432.200 1.431.000 1.537.700 1.704.800
BPI 751.000 774.900 809.800 898.800 1.018.100
SICAM 364.724 380.832 396.075 394.854 432.584
MG 311.658 294.064 306.662 347.198 367.949
BANIF 142.600 151.096 162.674 183.354 194.909
   Values in Thousands of Euros. 
 
Table 4. Three Year Average of Gross Income 
  2005 2006 2007 
BCP 2.423.300 2.439.933 2.449.667 
CGD 1.938.089 1.864.708 1.935.878 
BES 1.405.733 1.466.967 1.557.833 
BPI 778.567 827.833 908.900 
SICAM 380.544 390.587 407.838 
MG 304.128 315.975 340.603 
BANIF 152.123 165.708 180.312 
       Values in Thousands of Euros. 
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Table 5. Loans and Advances 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
BCP 45.451.000 49.177.000 49.939.000 54.038.000 57.912.000
CGD 45.204.000 45.006.000 46.619.000 49.936.000 57.268.000
BES 25.795.000 26.042.000 28.487.000 31.662.000 35.752.000
BPI 19.738.000 20.690.100 21.958.900 24.409.200 28.263.000
MG 9.970.119 10.141.287 10.653.708 12.415.395 13.660.648
SICAM 6.136.246 6.334.263 6.581.144 6.863.579 6.965.977
BANIF 3.948.239 4.184.365 3.715.532 4.685.195 5.342.949
   Values in Thousands of Euros. 
 
Table 6. Three Year Average of Loans and Advances 
  2005 2006 2007 
BCP 48.189.000 51.051.333 53.963.000 
CGD 45.609.667 47.187.000 51.274.333 
BES 26.774.667 28.730.333 31.967.000 
BPI 20.795.667 22.352.733 24.877.033 
MG 10.255.038 11.070.130 12.243.250 
SICAM 6.350.551 6.592.995 6.803.567 
BANIF 3.949.379 4.195.031 4.581.225 
      Values in Thousands of Euros.  
 
Table 7. Capital Charge for BIA 
  2005 2006 2007 
BCP 363.495 365.990 367.450 
CGD 290.713 279.706 290.382 
BES 210.860 220.045 233.675 
BPI 116.785 124.175 136.335 
SICAM 57.082 58.588 61.176 
MG 45.619 47.396 51.090 
BANIF 22.819 24.856 27.047 
         Values in Thousands of Euros.  
   
Table 8. Fraction of Gross Income per BL 
BL % PB 
Corporate Finance 10,6% 
Trading and Sales 17,3% 
Retail Banking 36,0% 
Commercial Banking 18,4% 
Payment and Settlement 3,0% 
Agency Services 3,8% 
Asset Management 4,6% 
Retail Brokerage 6,4% 
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 Table 9. Capital Charge for TSA  
  2005 2006 2007 
BCP 351.904 354.320 355.733 
CGD 281.443 270.787 281.122 
BES 204.136 213.028 226.224 
BPI 113.061 120.215 131.988 
SICAM 55.261 56.720 59.225 
MG 44.165 45.885 49.461 
BANIF 22.091 24.064 26.184 
      Values in Thousands of Euros. 
 
Table 10. LA for Retail and Commercial Banking 
  2005 2006 2007 
BCP 26.214.816 27.771.925 29.355.872 
CGD 24.811.659 25.669.728 27.893.237 
BES 14.565.419 15.629.301 17.390.048 
BPI 11.312.843 12.159.887 13.533.106 
MG 5.578.741 6.022.151 6.660.328 
SICAM 3.454.700 3.586.589 3.701.140 
BANIF 2.148.462 2.282.097 2.492.187 
       Values in Thousands of Euros. 
 
Table 11. Capital Charge for ASA    
  2005 2006 2007 
BCP 318.098 327.511 336.552 
CGD 274.596 273.636 290.610 
BES 181.157 191.303 207.314 
BPI 117.375 125.490 138.737 
MG 51.938 55.148 60.332 
SICAM 46.477 47.918 49.804 
BANIF 22.608 24.332 26.512 
          Values in Thousands of Euros. 
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Table 12. Results Analysis 
 
  
Capital Charge      Percentage Variation 
  2005 2006 2007   2005 2006 2007 
BIA 363.495 365.990 367.450 BIA/TSA -3,19% -3,19% -3,19% 
TSA 351.904 354.320 355.733 TSA/ ASA -9,61% -7,57% -5,39% BCP 
ASA 318.098 327.511 336.552 
BCP 
BIA/ ASA -12,49% -10,51% -8,41% 
BIA 290.713 279.706 290.382 BIA/TSA -3,19% -3,19% -3,19% 
TSA 281.443 270.787 281.122 TSA/ ASA -2,43% 1,05% 3,38% CGD 
ASA 274.596 273.636 290.610 
CGD 
BIA/ ASA -5,54% -2,17% 0,08% 
BIA 210.860 220.045 233.675 BIA/TSA -3,19% -3,19% -3,19% 
TSA 204.136 213.028 226.224 TSA/ ASA -11,26% -10,20% -8,36% BES 
ASA 181.157 191.303 207.314 
BES 
BIA/ ASA -14,09% -13,06% -11,28% 
BIA 116.785 124.175 136.335 BIA/TSA -3,19% -3,19% -3,19% 
TSA 113.061 120.215 131.988 TSA/ ASA 3,82% 4,39% 5,11% BPI 
ASA 117.375 125.490 138.737 
BPI 
BIA/ ASA 0,51% 1,06% 1,76% 
BIA 57.082 58.588 61.176 BIA/TSA -3,19% -3,19% -3,19% 
TSA 55.261 56.720 59.225 TSA/ ASA -15,90% -15,52% -15,91% SICAM 
ASA 46.477 47.918 49.804 
SICAM 
BIA/ ASA -18,58% -18,21% -18,59% 
BIA 45.619 47.396 51.090 BIA/TSA -3,19% -3,19% -3,19% 
TSA 44.165 45.885 49.461 TSA/ ASA 17,60% 20,19% 21,98% MG 
ASA 51.938 55.148 60.332 
MG 
BIA/ ASA 13,85% 16,36% 18,09% 
BIA 22.819 24.856 27.047 BIA/TSA -3,19% -3,19% -3,19% 
TSA 22.091 24.064 26.184 TSA/ ASA 2,34% 1,11% 1,25% BANIF 
ASA 22.608 24.332 26.512 
BANIF 
BIA/ ASA -0,92% -2,11% -1,98% 
Values in Thousands of Euros. 
 
    
 
 
 
